Weak TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- IANA name:
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- OpenSSL name:
- ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
- GnuTLS name:
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
- Hex code:
- 0xC0, 0x08
- TLS Version(s):
- TLS1.0, TLS1.1, TLS1.2, TLS1.3
- Protocol:
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- Key Exchange:
- PFS Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE)
- Authentication:
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
- Encryption:
- Triple-DES (Encrypt Decrypt Encrypt) in Cipher Block Chaining mode (3DES EDE CBC)
- Hash:
- HMAC Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA)
- Included in RFC:
- Machine-readable:
- application/json
In 2013, researchers demonstrated a timing attack against several TLS implementations using the CBC encryption algorithm (see isg.rhul.ac.uk). Additionally, the CBC mode is vulnerable to plain-text attacks in TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 and lower. A fix has been introduced with TLS 1.2 in form of the GCM mode which is not vulnerable to the BEAST attack. GCM should be preferred over CBC.
While Triple-DES is still recognized as a secure symmetric-key encryption, a more and more standardizations bodies and projects decide to deprecate this algorithm. Though not broken, it has been proven to suffer from several vulnerabilities in the past (see sweet32.info).
The Secure Hash Algorithm 1 has been proven to be insecure as of 2017 (see shattered.io).